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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
is not limitless to another person.32 The burdens which the other
person imposes may well outweigh the benefits he might bestow.A3
It does not necessarily follow from the above that recovery should
be allowed in Custodio. It is merely to stress that the difficult ironies
in the "wrongful life" cases are not present in this case. It is for
this reason that the court would do well to keep the "wrongful life"
cases on the periphery of the decision making process. Recovery in
Custodio and other unwanted child support cases would not be in-
ternally paradoxical. Recovery would depend on whether, in judicial
opinion, the subjective fear of undermining family life and psy-
chologically harming the child is outweighed by the objective finan-
cial damage to the plaintiff. It is this question that the court must
consider if it receives the case again on appeal.
RiCHARD J. BRYAN
Domestic Relations-Custody-Evidence-Has the Polar Star
Been Obscured by Statute in North Carolina?
"[T]he welfare of the child is the polar star by which the dis-
cretion of the court is to be guided. . . ." This oft quoted2 phrase
appears to be the guiding precept for the North Carolina courts in
custody cases except where it collides with the conflicting policy of
judicial economy.'
expressed; and could not, without incursion into the metaphysical, be
measured against the hypothesis of a child or imagined entity in some
way identifiable with claimant but of normal and lawful parentage and
possessed of normal or average advantages.
269 N.Y.S.2d 786, 787 (1966).
', To use an extreme example: The value of the life of someone at-
tacking an innocent victim with a knife would be de minimis from the view-
point of the innocent victim.
"One commentary glossed over this distinction. Referring to Ball v.
Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964), an unwanted child support
case, and Zepeda, the writer said:
In both... the claim is essentially that life could be damaging. Viewed
in this light, the claims seem contrary to a concept, fundamental to our
legal system, that life is inherently valuable. The practical importance
of all ramifications of this concept may be doubted in view of the cur-
rent population explosion. However, it is only realistic to consider that
it would seem extraordinary for a court to declare that life under any
adverse condition or to any person could be damaging.
9 UTAH L. Rav. 808, 814 n.37 (1965).
In re Lewis, 88 N.C. 31, 34 (1883).
R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 224 (1963).
* "Should we accept the contentions of the defendant and forbid the use
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In Guwtafson v. Gustafson4 Judge Mintz awarded custody of a
minor child to the mother after a preliminary hearing at which
ex parte affidavits were submitted to establish her mental stability.
The defendant husband's requests to cross examine the affiants and
to examine the physicians who treated Mrs. Gustafson for the illness
allegedly caused by the defendant's conduct were refused. The
supreme court' found that Judge Mintz did not abuse his discretion
in disallowing the cross examination of the affiants, and further
stated that he was not authorized under the proviso to the physician-
patient privilege statute to compel the disclosures sought by the
defendant since he was not a "presiding judge of a Superior Court
in term."' The court in the instant case appears to have foreclosed
the "polar star" in future cases by stating that the judge conducting
the preliminary hearing does not have the power to compel dis-
closure under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953) even though the
proper administration of justice requires it.
Custody was granted to the plaintiff approximately six months
after her return from a two year rest in a mental institution. Plain-
tiff twice attempted to take her own life while at the institution.
In light of the above facts, the welfare of the child dictates a full
investigation into the fitness of the mother before awarding custody
to her. It is impossible to perceive how the welfare of the child has
been enhanced by snatching her away from a home where she has
spent two years, especially in light of the fact that the defendant's
fitness is unchallenged 8 and the plaintiff's is so questionable. The
of affidavits and require the presence, examination and cross examination of
each of the witnesses at preliminary and temporary hearings and motions
pending trial, it would cause serious and unnecessary delay." Gustafson v.
Gustafson, 272 N.C. 452, 455, 158 S.E.2d 619, 621 (1967).
'272 N.C. 452, 158 S.E.2d 619 (1967).5Id., 158 S.E.2d 619 (1967).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953): Communications between physician
and patient.-No person, duly authorized to practice physic or surgery,
shall be required to disclose any information which he may have ac-
quired in attending a patient in a professional character, and which
information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient
as a physician, or to do any act for him as a surgeon: Provided, that
the presiding judge of a superior court may compel such disclosure,
if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper administration of
justice.
rd.
, The words "presiding judge of a superior court" refer to the superior
court judge who presides at the trial. Lockwood v. McCaskilI, 261 N.C. 754,
136 S.E.2d 67 (1964).8 "From the record it appears that both the plaintiff and the defendant
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disruptive effect of a change of custody on a child's world should
alone prevent a court from shifting custody where both parties
appear to be fit guardians.'
The court in the instant case appears to be more concerned with
establishing that the procedures employed for determining custody
did not work an injustice upon the defendant than with providing
for the welfare of the child."0 The court stressed the temporary
nature of the custody award. Theoretically, at least, the defendant
has not been seriously deprived of any of his rights since after the
trial of the case on the merits, the custody question will be considered
de novo.11 But practically he has been denied the companionship of
his child for an indeterminate period of time-the length of which
depends upon the congestion of the local calendar. Also, this period
of time spent with the mother is bound to influence the malleable
child's feelings and preference as to her choice of a permanent
guardian. The North Carolina Court has stated that "[the wishes
of a child of sufficient age to exercise discretion in choosing a custo-
dian is entitled to considerable weight when the contest is between
parents, but is not controlling."' 2 Often, in close cases where both
parents are fit guardians, the judge at the de movo hearing will be
reluctant to cast the child's world into chaos by changing the custody
order. In the above situation it is possible that the original defeated
party has had his rights foreclosed at the abbreviated preliminary
custody hearing.
In order to remedy the above mentioned ills, a certain amount
are of good character and that the court could well have adjudged that
both were fit and suitable persons to have custody of this child." 272 N.C.
452, 458, 158 S.E.2d 619, 623 (1967).
g "[W]here young children have been placed in one home.., for a sub-
stantial period of time and the situation seems satisfactory, there is a re-
luctance to uproot the children from familiar surroundings and place them
in a strange home with a parent who hardly knows them." 24 Am. Jur. 2d.
Divorce and Separation § 820 (1966).
"0 "The ultimate right of cross examination will be afforded the parties
at the trial of the cause, and this is within the purview of the Court's decision
in Stanback v. Stanback (citations omitted)." 272 N.C. 452, 455, 158 S.E.2d
619, 621 (1967). "It must be recalled that at the trial of the case affidavits
will not be admissible and that the witnesses must appear in person. Therefore
the fact that in this hearing for a temporary purpose the plaintiff used affi-
davits of physicians who treated her does not bring into play the proviso of
G.S. 8-54." Id. at 457, 158 S.E.2d at 622.Stanback v. Stanback, 270 N.C. 497, 155 S.E.2d 221 (1967).
1
'James v. Pretlow, 242 N.C. 102, 105, 86 S.E.2d 759, 761 (1955).
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of judicial economy' 3 will have to be sacrificed in the interest of
justice and the welfare of children. It will be necessary to grant a
full judicial hearing in the first instance on the custody question.
At present, the presiding judge has the authority to make these! hear-
ings as broad or as narrow as he, in his discretion, deems necessary.
This power is nugatory when mental or emotional stability is the
critical issue since the judge does not have the authority to compel
disclosure from treating physicians under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53
(1953). A statutory amendment will be necessary to extend the
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953) proviso power to a judge presiding
at custody hearings.14
The legislature will be required to amend N.C. GEN. STAT. §
8-53 (1953) in order to avoid the inconsistency and embarassment
of having, in effect, two different physician-patient privilege statutes
-one absolute, and one qualified. The privilege in the newly created
district courts would be absolute since the district court judges do
not possess the power to compel disclosure under the present statute.' 5
This factor gains added significance since the district court has
exclusive jurisdiction over custody matters. 6 The legislature need
only take a short, but prudent, step to extend the proviso power to
judges presiding at custody hearings. The rationale behind the pro-
"s Much of the evidence presented at the custody hearing will be duplicated
at the trial on the merits.
" The court has construed the proviso power to be limited to "the pre-
siding judge of a Superior Court in term." A superior court judge in cham-
bers has been denied the proviso power. Yow v. Pittman, 241 N.C. 69, 84
S.E.2d 297 (1954) .
1 The only possible method of avoiding this result would be for the
courts to construe N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-291(6) (Supp. 1967) as a catch-all
phrase granting the proviso power to district court judges. The language
of this section does not appear broad enough for such a construction:
To issue all process and orders necessary or proper in the exercise of
his powers and authority, and to effectuate his lawful judgments and
decrees.
Id.
It is doubtful that the court will adopt such a liberal construction of this
section in order to grant the proviso power to district court judges in
light of the court's marked reluctance to construe liberally the proviso power
in the past. See Sims v. Insurance Co., 257 N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962);
Yow v. Pittman, 241 N.C. 69, 84 S.E.2d 297 (1954).
" See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-244 (Supp. 1967): Domestic Relations.-
The district court division is the proper division, without regard to
the amount in controversy, for the trial of civil actions and proceed-
ings for annulment, divorce, alimony, child support, and child custody.
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viso,' 7 the unique character of custody proceedings,"8 and the lack
of a strong foundation for the physician-patient privilege 0 all strong-
ly favor this step. It is in fact necessary to return the "polar star"
to its rightful position. 0
WILLIAM J. DOCKERY
Evidence-Expert Testimony-Physician's Opinion
Based on Patient's Statements
In Todd v. Watts,' plaintiff sought damages for persistent head-
aches and backaches allegedly resulting from injuries she had sus-
tained in an automobile collision. Her evidence showed a collision,
and that she had been thrown forward, striking her head on the
windshield, her knees on the dashboard and wrenching her back.
An orthopedic surgeon who had treated plaintiff testified in her
behalf. He first related the history of the complaints, as told by
the plaintiff on her first visit to him for treatment. This testimony
included reference to the accident and a recitation that she told him
"she was thrown forward when the collision occurred, striking her
head and forehead against the front windshield glass, breaking the
glass and abrading her forehead. She told me... she also wrenched
and contused both knees and her low back."2 There was no objection
to this testimony, although on request of defense counsel its use
was limited to corroborating the testimony previously given by the
plaintiff.' The doctor then was asked to give certain opinions as
17 The proviso was inserted by the legislature to prevent the privilege from
serving as a bar to justice.
"s As noted above, time may be a controlling factor in this type of litiga-
tion. Also, it may be extremely important to the welfare of the child that the
initial determination be correct.
" See Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Jitstice Served or Ob-
structed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 Yale L.J.
607 (1943).
" The question of whether to remove a child from the custody of its
natural mother is one over which judges have agonized from time im-
memorial. See In re Two Mothers, 1 Kings 3:11-28, decided by King Solo-
mon, evidently the first 'reported' case. Klein v. Klein, 204 So. 2d 239 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1580 (1967).
1269 N.C. 417, 152 S.E.2d 448 (1967). For a previous discussion of this
case, see Brandis, Evidence, Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 45 N.C.L.
REv. 934, 949-51 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Brandis].
2269 N.C. at 421, 152 S.E.2d at 451-52 (dissenting opinion).
'Id. at 421, 152 S.E.2d at 451. This seems consistent with North Caro-
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